



TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

Current Situations Update after March 11 Earthquake

Shareholder & Investor Relations Group
Corporate Affairs Department

April 26, 2011

Regarding Forward-Looking Statements (Performance Projections)

Certain statements in the following presentation regarding The Tokyo Electric Power Company's business operations may constitute "forward-looking statements." As such, these statements are not historical facts but rather predictions about the future, which inherently involve risks and uncertainties, and these risks and uncertainties could cause the Company's actual results to differ materially from the forward-looking statements (performance projections) herein.

(Note)

Please note that the following to be an accurate and complete translation of the original Japanese version prepared for the convenience of our English-speaking investors. In case of any discrepancy between the translation and the Japanese original, the latter shall prevail.



Agenda

1. Incidents on Fukushima Daiichi & Daini Nuclear Power Stations

- ✓ Overview of Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake
- ✓ Summary of incidents at the Power Stations
- ✓ Current Situations and Status at the Power Stations
- ✓ Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
- ✓ Our Commitment to the Stricken Areas, etc.

2. Demand & Supply Outlook

【Appendix】 Nuclear Damage Compensation Scheme in Japan

(note)

- *TEPCO has decided to postpone the date of Fiscal 2010 year-end earnings results announcement due to the earthquake which struck off northeastern coast of Japan on March 11. We will let our investors know a new date of the announcement on our website once we make a decision on the date.*
- *Please note any information about Fiscal 2010 year-end earnings results, Fiscal 2011 outlook, financial figures for damages or compensation, or future dividends is NOT provided in this material.*

Overview of Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake



as of 0:00PM Apr. 25

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- ✓ Date & Time: 2:46PM on Friday March 11, 2011
- ✓ Epicenter: Offshore Sanriku coast (northern latitude of 38 degrees, east longitude of 142.9), 24km in depth
- ✓ Magnitude: 9.0M
- ✓ Seismic Intensity (in Japanese Scale):
 - Level 7: Kurihara City (Miyagi Pref.)
 - Level 6+: Naraha Town, Tomioka Town, Ohkuma Town, Futaba Town (Fukushima Pref.)
 - Level 6- : Ishinomaki City, Onagawa Town (Miyagi Pref.), Tokai Vil. (Ibaraki Pref.)
 - Level 5-: Kariwa Vil. (Niigata Pref.)
 - Level 4: Rokkasho Vil., Higashidori Vil., Mutsu City, Ohma Town (Aomori Pref.), Kashiwazaki City (Niigata Pref.)

【Epicenter】

Issued at 14:53
on March 11, 2011




* gal: a unit of acceleration defined as cm/s^2 .

Overview of Incidents at Units of Fukushima Daiichi NPS

as of 0:00PM Apr. 25

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- ✓ All the operating units were automatically “shutdown” with all control rods inserted immediately after the earthquake occurred. Nuclear reaction was successfully stopped.
- ✓ Almost all of the “Cooling” functions at reactors and spent fuel pools were completely lost, as a result of losing power supply not only from external power networks due to the earthquake but also from emergency diesel generators due to its following tsunami.
- ✓ Radiation “Containment” function has been lost as we have detected highly contaminated water pools in turbine buildings.





- ✓ At Units 1 through 3, we continually conduct discharging fresh water into pressure vessels in order to cool nuclear fuels inside by temporary motor pumps. The level of coolant in the reactors is negative but stable.
- ✓ To cool spent nuclear fuels in Spent Fuel Pools of Units 1 through 4, we have conducted spraying fresh water from the top of the structures and pouring fresh water via Fuel Pool Cooling System.
- ✓ We are now discharging highly contaminated water found in turbine buildings of Units 1 through 3 to the corresponding condensers.
- ✓ We continue injecting nitrogen, which is inert gas, into Unit 1 reactor containment vessel in order to mitigate the risk of possible hydrogen explosions. The injecting operations are also scheduled for Units 2 and 3.
- ✓ TEPCO confirmed status of “cold shutdown” at Units 5 and 6 on March 20.

			Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit 5	Unit 6
At the Time of Earthquake	Operating Status		Commercial Operation	Commercial Operation	Commercial Operation	Periodic Inspection	Periodic Inspection	Periodic Inspection
Current Situation and Status	“Shutdown”		○	○	○	—	—	—
	“Cooling”	Reactor	△ Fresh Water being Poured	△ Fresh Water being Poured	△ Fresh Water being Poured	— No Fuel in the Reactor	○ Cold Shutdown Since Mar. 20	○ Cold Shutdown Since Mar. 20
		SFP	△	△	△	△	○	○
	“Containment”*		× Highly Contaminated Water Found	× Highly Contaminated Water Found	× Highly Contaminated Water Found	△	○	○

* Top of the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings have severely damaged. At Unit 2, the containing function of the pressure suppression chamber is unlikely to be maintained. Moreover, we made holes in the walls of Units 5 and 6 reactor buildings to prevent hydrogen accumulation.


- ✓ All the units were automatically “shutdown” immediately after the earthquake occurred.
- ✓ At Unit 1, 2 and 4, although external power supply continued, heat removal functions for reactors of the units were lost by tsunami. Later, the functions were restored and the 3 units reached a state of “cold shutdown” by March 15.
- ✓ Unit 3 had been continuously cooled down and reached “cold shutdown” in about 22 hours after the earthquake.

		Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4
At the Time of Earthquake	Operating Status	Commercial Operation	Commercial Operation	Commercial Operation	Commercial Operation
Current Situation and Status	“Shutdown”	○	○	○	○
	“Cooling”	○ Cold Shutdown Since Mar.14	○ Cold Shutdown Since Mar.14	○ Cold Shutdown Since Mar.12	○ Cold Shutdown Since Mar.15
	“Containment”	○	○	○	○


- ✓ To establish stable cooling systems for the reactors and spent fuel pools, TEPCO sets 2 targets and corresponding time lines; “STEP 1: radiation level steadily decreasing” for the first 3 months and “STEP 2: emission of radioactive substances is fully under control and consequently radiation level is kept quite low” for the next 3 to 6 months.

< Roadmap for Immediate Actions (Issues / Targets / Major Countermeasures) >


		Current Status	STEP1 (around 3 months) “Radiation dose is in steady decline”	STEP2 (around 3 to 6 months after achieving Step 1) “Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down”	Mid-term Issues
I. Cooling	(1) Reactors	Injecting fresh water	Nitrogen gas injection (Unit1・3) Flooding up to top of active fuel Examination and implementation of heat exchange function (Unit 2) Sealing the damaged location	Stable cooling Flooding up to top of active fuel	Prevention of breakage of structural materials , etc.
	(2) Spent Fuel Pools	Injecting fresh water	Enhance reliability of water injection Restore coolant circulation system (Unit 4) Install supporting structure	Stable cooling Remote control of water injection Examination and implementation of heat exchange function	Removal of fuels
II. Mitigation	(3) Accumulated Water	Transferring water with high radiation level Storing water with low radiation level	Installation of storage / processing facilities Installation of storage facilities / decontamination processing	Secure storage place Expansion of storage / processing facilities Decontamination / Desalt processing (reuse), etc	Decrease contaminated water Installation of full-fledged water treatment facilities
	(4) Atmosphere / Soil		Dispersion of inhibitor Removal of debris Installing reactor building cover		Installation of reactor building cover (container with concrete) Solidification of contaminated soil, etc
III. Monitoring/Decontamination	(5) Measurement, Reduction and Announcement	Monitoring of radiation dose in and out of the power station	Expand/enhance monitoring and inform of results fast and accurately	Sufficiently reduce radiation dose in evacuation order / planned evacuation / emergency evacuation preparation areas	Continue monitoring and informing environmental safety



- ✓ TEPCO had taken enough countermeasures against assumed highest tsunami water level of O.P.+5.7 meters or 18'8" at Fukushima Daiichi NPS revised in 2002 by Japan Society of Civil Engineers.
- ✓ At Fukushima Daiichi, almost all building areas were flooded with an inundation depth of +14 ~ +15 meters or +45'11" ~ +49'3" above the O.P., approximately +4 ~ +5 meters or +13'1" to ~16'5" above the ground level.
- ✓ At Fukushima Daini, surrounding areas of Units 1 and 2 buildings and the south side of Unit 3 building were inundated as sea water level rose +6.5 ~ +7m or +21'4" ~ +23' above the O.P.
- ✓ Accordingly, we concluded that tsunami Impact on Fukushima Daiichi was much larger than that on Fukushima Daini.



Fukushima Daiichi



Fukushima Daini




(C) GeoEye

Our Commitment to the Stricken Areas

- ✓ We have established a "Fukushima Nuclear Influence Response Division" under the direct control of President.
- ✓ Together with the Government's Nuclear Evacuators Life Support Team and through our Fukushima Nuclear Influence Response Division, we will faithfully support the afflicted areas and the evacuated residents.

<Organization Chart>



■ Our Supporting Activities in the Stricken Areas

- Support on goods/items: Continuously delivering necessities to the residents of locating and neighboring towns of Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Stations
- Support on labor: Dispatching our employees to evacuation centers for the residents of the locating and neighboring towns in order to supply labor power for the activities such as unloading the shipments and preparation for meals, etc.
- Support on residence: Offering the Company's corporate apartments to the people
- Other Supports: Purchasing food products of Fukushima for meals served at our company's cafeterias

- ✓ Based on Act of Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Japanese government's "Economic Damage Response Headquarters" decided that TEPCO should pay the people forced to evacuate due to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station their present necessary funds.
- ✓ TEPCO has decided to pay "Temporary Compensation" to the evacuated people. (press released on Apr. 15)

Eligibility for the application: People living in areas designated as "Evacuation" or "Shelter in place" pursuant to Article 15, clause 3 of Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

■ Areas under Evacuation Order

- Within 20km radius of the periphery of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
- Within 10km radius of the periphery of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station

■ Areas under Shelter in Place Order

- Between 20km and 30km radius of the periphery of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Amount to be paid: 1,000,000 yen per household (750,000 yen per individual's household)

Time Line:

- ☐ On April 15 and after: Started preparation with local governments within "Evacuation" and "Shelter in Place" areas
 - * We will hold information sessions and begin distributing application forms at places such as evacuation centers.
- ☐ On April 28 (planned): Open Fukushima Nuclear Compensation Office
 - * We will start the payment of "Temporary Compensation" once all the preparations are completed.




- ✓ All Incorporating earthquake's impact on industry and power saving efforts, we project the highest daily peak demand in coming summer of 55GW at generation end, 5GW lower than that the record-breaking hot previous summer. Average weekday peak demand this summer is expected to be approximately 48GW.
- ✓ While TEPCO is working hard to increase supply capacity, at this point it is unlikely to meet the highest daily peak demand this summer. TEPCO is committed to continuing our best efforts to avoid rolling blackouts in this summer with every possible demand- and supply-side countermeasures.

☆Additional Supply Capacity toward Summer

(based on press release "Power Supply and Demand Outlook in This Summer and Measures" on Mar.25 and Apr.15)


(Unit: GW at generation end)



Total output of TEPCO's own thermal power plants resumed or restarted since March 11 earthquake: Approx. 12.1GW


- ✓ TEPCO has been making best efforts to resume damaged thermal power plants, beginning with less damaged ones to speedily increase supply capacity after the earthquake to meet power demand.
- ✓ Since March 11, TEPCO has worked for shortening periods of inspections and repair works on non-damaged thermal power plants.
- ✓ TEPCO is also working for severely damaged ocean-side thermal power plants which were not in operations at the time of the earthquake.

☆Cumulative Output of Thermal Power Plants resumed/restarted since March 11 Earthquake





- ✓ Pumped-storage hydro is a type of power generation methods for load-balancing, intended to store power generated in night time and to use it in daytime. In this method, water is pumped up from a lower reservoir to a higher one by using off-peak nighttime power and is released to generate power during daytime of peak-demand.
- ✓ This type of power generation is typically utilized as an important additional supply capacity for peak demand or as an effective measure for adjusting fluctuating daytime frequency in power grids. As we always need to hold a certain amount of effective pumped-storage hydro capacity in preparation for the situations above while generating hours are limited due to the volume of water, close examination on supply & demand balancing is required if we expect to operate the hydro for longer time in a day.

☆Illustration of Pumped-Storage Hydro Utilization





	Anegasaki Thermal	Sodegaura Thermal	Chiba Thermal	Ohi Thermal	Kawasaki Thermal
Output	Approx. 6MW (1.4MW×4)	Approx. 0.11GW (1.1MW×102)	Approx. 1GW (0.334GW×3)	Approx. 0.21GW (①0.128GW×1) (② 0.081GW×1)	0.128GW (0.128GW×1)
Type	Diesel	Gas Engine	1,500°C-class Gas Turbine	Gas Turbine ①1,100°C-class ②1,300°C-class	1,100°C-class Gas Turbine
Fuel	Light Gas	LNG	LNG	Urban Gas	LNG
Commencement of Operation	April 2011	July 2011	1st: August 2011 2nd: August 2011 3rd: Summer 2012	July 2011	August 2011
Location Image					

- ✓ Toward summer 2012, TEPCO aims to resume stable power supply with further increasing supply capacity, including resumption of severely damaged thermal power plants and temporary installation of additional gas turbine generators.
- ✓ In mid-to-long term, we are committed to securing stable and sustainable power supply with steady development of new power sources in the planning stage or under construction.

☆Key Measures to Increase Supply Capacity

Measures for Summer 2012	■ Resumption of severely damaged thermal power plants ■ Temporary installation of additional gas turbine generators ■ Utilization of power generated by newly constructed power plants under trial operations — Kawasaki Thermal Power Station Unit 2-1 (0.5GW) — Kannagawa Hydro Power Station Unit 2 (0.47GW)
Measures in Mid-to-long Term	■ Steady development of power sources in the planning stage or under construction — Hitachinaka Thermal Power Station Unit 2 (under construction, 1GW) — Kawasaki Thermal Power Station Unit 2-2,3 (in the planning stage, 0.71GW each) — Kazunogawa Hydro Power Station Unit 4 (in the planning stage, 0.4GW) - etc.

1. Purposes of Nuclear Damage Compensation Scheme

- ✓ Legal Protection to Victims (§ 1 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law)
 - Facilitating victims' compensation claims and securing enough compensation or indemnity for them
- ✓ Contribution to Sound Development of Nuclear Power (§ 1 of the Law)
 - Making nuclear operators foresee possible their financial burdens for damage compensation in case of emergency by clarifying national government's responsible involvement in such cases so that nuclear power in this country could be steadily developed to the future

2. Coverage of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Scheme


- ✓ Damages Caused by Nuclear Operations (§ 2 of the Law)
 - Direct damages caused by exposures to radiations, including physical damages on human body and/or personal property
 - Indirect damages in causal relationship with a series of accidents, including evacuation expenses, losses from suspension of whole or a part of business operations, etc.

3. Ranges of Nuclear Operators' Responsibility and Governmental Supports under the Scheme

- ✓ Ranges of Nuclear Operators' Responsibility (§ 3 of the Law)
 - In principle, nuclear operators are solely responsible for all of compensation for damages caused by their nuclear facilities. (§ 3.1)
 - However, this clause should not be applicable to cases caused by extraordinary massive natural disaster or social upheaval. (Proviso to § 3.1)
- ✓ Mandate Measures to be taken by Nuclear Operators in preparation for Possible Damage Compensation (§ 6 and 7 of the Law)
 - Nuclear operators are required to make a “Nuclear Liability Insurance” contract with insurance companies and an “Indemnity Agreement for Nuclear Damage Compensation” with national government. (§ 6)
 - Insurance coverage for each of contracts per site is up to 120 billion yen.(§ 7.1)
- ✓ Governmental Supports (§ 16 of the Law)
 - National government is to provide a nuclear operator with necessary supports enough to complete compensation when the operator's liability exceeds the amount of insurance coverage and the assistance is regarded indispensable to accomplish the law's purposes.(§ 16.1)

Reference: “Nuclear Damage Compensation Scheme” (Science and Technology Agency, 1995)

4. Illustration of Nuclear Operator's Responsibility and Liability on the Law



<Elucidation by a publication “Nuclear Damage Compensation Scheme” (Science and Technology Agency, 1995)>

- ✓ “Support” typically includes financial assistance such as subsidy, low-interest special loan and interest aids. Article 16 of the law is thought to guarantee the financial assistance when an operator's liability exceed the amount of insurance coverage and the assistance is regarded necessary to accomplish the law's purposes.
- ✓ “Extraordinary massive natural disaster” indicates an unprecedented-level catastrophe in Japanese history. For instance, The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9 on the Richter scale, over 100,000 people killed) is not “extraordinary massive” but just “massive”. To apply the exemption clause to a certain natural disaster, its scale must considerably exceed the 1923 Earthquake's one.